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MATTHEW HUGHES 
Introduction 
In the first part of this article published in JSAHR, the author established the legal basis for 
British repressive actions in Palestine during the Arab revolt, 1936-39, and presented evidence 
that illustrated the toughness of British military on operations against rebel forces in Palestine. 
The second part of this extended article develops the theme of British brutality in Palestine, 
starting with two empirical case studies that further illustrate questionable British counter-
insurgency methods. It also presents a conclusion to the extended article, linking together the 
various debates in both parts. 
 
Atrocities at al-Bassa and Halhul 
Two single incidents during the Arab revolt arguably meet the definition of an atrocity. Neither 
has been widely discussed, even in the Arabic-language literature, but they do appear in printed 
primary records and in recent TV programmes.
1
 The British army was responsible for both 
incidents. These occurred at the villages of al-Bassa, in the Acre district by the Lebanon border, 
in September 1938, and at Halhul near Hebron in May 1939. Contemporaneous Palestinian 
papers such as Filastin [Palestine] make passing mention of an outrage that seems to be the one 
at al-Bassa, but there is nothing in Filastin on Halhul.
2
 Filastin was closed during the al-Bassa 
incident, re-opening on 14 September 1938, as was al-Difa‘ [The Defence], after which it said 
nothing about al-Bassa. Outside Palestine, the Arabic press made some comment on al-Bassa, 
before noting that British troops „ont fait plusieurs expéditions punitives dans les villages de la 
région‟, suggesting that al-Bassa was not an isolated incident but one of a set of punishments 
inflicted on the Palestinians.
3
 As already mentioned, strict British censorship during the uprising 
ensured that Palestinian (Arabic-language) papers were closed for long periods of time and the 
Palestinian Arabic press was unable to make critical comment on British military activities in the 
country after 1936.
4
 Indeed, the Zionist press – such as the Palestine Post, Haaretz [The Land] or 
Davar [Issue/Thing] – has more comment on Britain‟s repression of the revolt than the heavily 
censored Arabic-language press. 
The British killed some twenty villagers at al-Bassa, most if not all in cold-blood, during 
an operation in which villagers were also tortured according to Arabic sources. Up to fifteen men 
died in Halhul, mostly elderly Palestinians (the youngest victim was thirty-five, the oldest 
seventy-five) who died after being left out in the sun for several days in a caged enclosure with 
insufficient water. Halhul villagers also claim that soldiers shot a local man at a well during the 
same operation – in fact, it seems that soldiers beat the victim and then left him to drown in the 
well.
5
 To build up a picture of how and why these atrocities happened, and what they tell us 
about British methods, an outline of events prior to these atrocities is useful. 
At al-Bassa, British troops claimed that they had been the victims of roadside bomb and 
mine attacks – what today we would call „IEDs.‟ While this could be true, it is not clear whether 
these attacks were serious or sustained; nor is it apparent that the troops suffered any significant 
casualties before the al-Bassa incident. Thus, this general claim of prior rebel attacks might have 
been the justification used for a subsequent policy designed to prevent serious attacks. The 
British commander of the Royal Ulster Rifles (RUR), the unit in charge of the area in the autumn 
of 1938, informed the mukhtars (headmen) of all the Palestinian villages on the Lebanese 
frontier that if any of his men hit a mine he would take punitive measures against the nearest 
village to the scene of the mine. The commander‟s logic was that Arab insurgents when they laid 
a mine always informed villagers close by, notwithstanding the fact that guerrilla groups often 
came from outside of Palestine and comprised Syrians and other foreigners. On the evening of 6 
September 1938, an RUR armoured truck hit a mine near the village of al-Bassa, killing four 
RUR soldiers – Lieutenant John Anthony Law, Lance-Corporals J. Andrews and C. Kennedy, 
and Rifleman A. Coalter – two of whom (Andrews and Coalter) died on the 6th, with two dying 
from their wounds on the 7th (Kennedy) and the 9th (Law).
6
 The blast also seriously wounded 
two men. An RUR officer present at the time, Desmond Woods, recalled what happened next in 
an oral history interview given many years later: 
  
Now I will never forget this incident….We were at al-Malikiyya, the other frontier base 
and word came through about 6 o‟clock in the morning that one of our patrols had been 
blown up and Millie Law [the dead officer] had been killed. Now Gerald Whitfeld 
[Lieutenant-Colonel G. H. P. Whitfeld, the battalion commander] had told these mukhtars 
that if any of this sort of thing happened he would take punitive measures against the 
nearest village to the scene of the mine. Well the nearest village to the scene of the mine 
was a place called al-Bassa and our Company C were ordered to take part in punitive 
measures. And I will never forget arriving at al-Bassa and seeing the Rolls Royce 
armoured cars of the 11th
 
Hussars peppering Bassa with machine gun fire and this went 
on for about 20 minutes and then we went in and I remembered we had lighted braziers 
and we set the houses on fire and we burnt the village to the ground. Now Monty was our 
divisional commander at the time, with his headquarters at Haifa, and he happened to be 
out on his balcony of his headquarters, and he saw a lot of smoke rising in the hills and he 
called one of his staff officers and he said „I wonder what this smoke is in the hills there‟ 
and one of them said „I think that must be the Royal Ulster Rifles taking punitive 
measures against Bassa.‟ Well we all thought that this was going to be the end of our 
commanding officer Gerald Whitfeld, because you know certainly if it happened these 
days it would‟ve been. Well anyway Monty had him up and he asked him all about it and 
Gerald Whitfeld explained to him. He said „Sir, I have warned the mukhtars in these 
villages that if this happened to any of my officers or men, I would take punitive 
measures against them and I did this and I would‟ve lost control of the frontier if I 
hadn‟t.‟ Monty said „All right but just go a wee bit easier in the future.‟7 
 
This is not the full story. Before or after destroying the village, almost certainly the latter, 
RUR soldiers with some attached Royal Engineers collected approximately fifty men from al-
Bassa and blew some of them up in a contrived explosion under a bus. Harry Arrigonie, a British 
Palestine policeman at al-Bassa at the time, recalled what happened in his memoirs, with the 
British „herding‟ about twenty men from al-Bassa „onto a bus. Villagers who panicked and tried 
to escape were shot. The driver of the bus was forced to drive along the road, over a land mine 
buried by the soldiers. This second mine was much more powerful than the first [i.e., the rebels‟ 
mine] and it completely destroyed the bus, scattering the maimed and mutilated bodies of the 
men on board everywhere. The villagers were then forced to dig a pit, collect the bodies, and 
throw them unceremoniously into it.‟8 Arrigonie provides grisly photographs of the maimed 
bodies, taken by British Constable Ricke, present at the incident, and he claimed that the officer 
involved had been „severely reprimanded.‟9 Recalling the same incident, a senior British 
Palestine police office, Raymond Cafferata, wrote to his wife, „You remember reading of an 
Arab bus blown up on the frontier road just after Paddy [a slang term for the Irish] was killed. 
Well the Ulsters did it – a 42 seater full of Arabs and an RE [Royal Engineers] Sgt [Sergeant] 
blew the mine. Since that day not a single mine has been laid on that road.‟10 
The atrocity at al-Bassa prompted the Anglican Bishop of Jerusalem, the Rt. Rev. G. F. 
Graham Brown, himself a former military man who had been battalion adjutant of the King‟s 
Own Scottish Borderers in the First World War, to visit al-Bassa and then call upon B. L. 
Montgomery, the divisional commander for northern Palestine. Keith-Roach, the senior colonial 
official, recounted the encounter between the bishop and the general: „He had a long interview 
with Montgomery and came back absolutely bewildered. To every question, he said, Monty had 
but one reply: “I shall shoot them.” “The man is blood mad,” the bishop moaned across my 
office table.‟11 
A letter in Arabic of 8 September 1938 giving the Palestinian side of events extends the 
atrocity to include premeditated torture. The letter dates the rebel mine explosion to 22.30 hrs on 
6 September, following which, on the morning of 7 September, soldiers came to al-Bassa. They 
shot four people in the streets, in cafes and in the homes of the village, after which the soldiers 
searched and looted the village, before gathering and beating inhabitants with sticks and rifle 
butts. The British then took one hundred villagers to a nearby military base – Camp Number One 
– where the British commander selected four men (the letter lists their names) who were tortured 
in front of the rest of the group. The four men were undressed and made to kneel barefoot on 
cacti and thorns, specially prepared for the occasion. Eight soldiers then told off the four men 
and two per Arab detainee set about beating them „without pity‟ in front of the group. Pieces of 
flesh „flew from their bodies‟ and the victims fainted, after which an army doctor came and 
checked their pulses. Of course, harshly whipping villagers was not new, the British having done 
the same thing to the fellahin during the Egyptian revolt in 1919, photographing the effects.
12
 
Interestingly, when the British tried lashing Zionist insurgents who were in jail on robbery 
charges in 1946, they met with articulate resistance, Jewish fighters replying by kidnapping and 
lashing four British officers; the British then pragmatically stopped using this method of 
punishment. Meanwhile, at al-Bassa, the army then took the group of villagers to another base – 
Camp Number Two – while soldiers destroyed the village of al-Bassa. All of this happened on 
the morning of 7 September, with the army withdrawing at 13.00 hrs on the same day.
13
 While 
this letter does not mention the villagers blown up on the bus, another letter of 20 September 
1938 refers to the British and Jewish police blowing up arrested suspects in this fashion along the 
Lebanese border, the British sending back to the villages the mangled bits of bodies or quickly 
burying them.
14
 Thus, it seems that the army destroyed the village on the 7 September, returning 
some days later with engineers and some police officers to kill more villagers in one or more 
mine explosions under vehicles filled with local Arabs. 
An 11th Hussar NCO present at al-Bassa remembered how he and his men had „flattened‟ 
the village – „blew the lot‟ – before referring to a similar incident near Nablus where the 11th 
Hussars after suffering casualties destroyed another village.
15
 There are other cryptic comments 
scattered through the records from British officers to their destroying and burning villages but 
the vague references to what happened and the reticence of British officers fully to record what 
they were doing hampers further research. The Rt. Rev. W. H. Stewart, the Anglican Archdeacon 
of Jerusalem and, from 1938, Hon. Chaplain to the Palestine Police and so no enemy of the 
force, wrote of dark deeds in rural areas of Palestine, concluding, however, that while his 
evidence was „absolutely trustworthy, is second hand and not such that I can produce.‟16 
The second major incident was at Halhul in May 1939. Located on the road between 
Hebron and Bethlehem, the British believed that Halhul was sympathetic to the rebels. The Black 
Watch Regiment surrounded and took over the village in May 1939. What followed was an 
attempt to get villagers to hand over rifles, a recurring British demand during village searches, by 
setting up two wired cages. One was a „good‟ cage in which there was plenty of water, food and 
shelter from the sun, and one was a „bad‟ cage in which men were left in the open in the intense 
heat with between half and one pint of water per day. In an interview with a BBC „Timewatch‟ 
team working on a 1991 programme on the Arab revolt – what it called „the first intifada‟ – the 
commanding officer of the Black Watch emphasised the voluntary nature of the action; villagers 
could escape the heat simply by handing over a rifle, after which they would be moved to the 
„good‟ cage. What he does not make clear is what the villagers were to do if they did not have a 
rifle.
17
 
Again, a closer examination of the sources paints a less rosy picture of the events at 
Halhul. Keith-Roach, in a private letter, wrote that only a half pint of water was distributed, and 
he does not refer to a „good‟ cage. Instead, after the military high command had given the 
commander of the Black Watch the green light, soldiers rounded up all the men of the village, 
 
…. instructed that they be kept there [in an open cage] and he gave them half a pint of 
water per diem. I saw the original order. The weather was very hot for it was summer. 
According to Indian Army Medical standards, four pints of water a day is the minimum 
that a man can live upon exposed to hot weather. After 48 hours treatment most of the 
men were very ill and eleven old and enfeebled ones died. I was instructed that no civil 
inquest should be held. Finally, the High Commissioner, MacMichael, decided 
compensation should be paid, and my Assistant and I assessed the damage at the highest 
rate allowed by the law, and paid out over three thousand pounds to the bereft families.
18
 
 
The British doctor, Forster, talks of two cages, one for the men and one for the women, and 
makes no mention of an option to escape the cages. They were there just for punishment. „We 
may yet teach Hitler something new about the conduct of concentration camps‟ was Forster‟s 
acerbic conclusion.
19
 An Arab whose father died at Halhul claimed that between eleven and 
fourteen men died after two weeks in the sun with no food and water, one at a village well where 
„soldiers kept pushing him and he was killed.‟20 The same man recalled electric 
generators/floodlights/heaters running all night to increase the detainees‟ privations, some being 
so hungry that they ate dirt. A woman from Halhul noted that ten men died, two at the well 
incident, the British only releasing the men after the villagers produced forty old Turkish rifles, 
and that this was after eight days‟ captivity. The same woman also recalled the night-time lights, 
and how the soldiers beat them and threw away food that the women brought for their captive 
menfolk. „Without guns those men will never be released,‟ one British official („local British 
ruler‟) told her.21 Other Arab accounts talk of the use of „cages‟ for three days „at least‟ in 
military operations in other villages.
22
 
In correspondence surrounding a Thames TV programme on Palestine,
23
 both Geoffrey 
Morton (formerly of the Palestine police) and Sir Thomas Scrivener (a former Assistant District 
Commissioner in Palestine) challenged the idea that villagers were denied water in village 
searches, with Morton questioning the „senile old‟ peasant that Thames TV had „dragged in‟ to 
recount his tale. It is not clear if these relate to Halhul or are more general comment but Thames 
TV‟s reply is interesting: 
 The problems of the oral tradition (confusing hearsay with personal experience) made us 
doubt it, too, and the sequence was cut when our Zionist adviser told us that these stories 
originated as black propaganda in Nazi Germany. One of my colleagues, however, 
undertook a personal search in the Public Record Office and found the original papers. 
As soon as this incident took place, Government House informed the Secretary of State 
that people had died during an arms search. The Secretary of State asked for full details 
because of the danger of Nazi propaganda, and payments of £2,000 were made to the 
bereaved families.
24
 
 
The reference to compensation suggests that this could be a reference to the Halhul incident of 
May 1939. 
 One of the survivors of the cages at Halhul recounted to Forster, the Hebron doctor, the 
events of May 1939: 
 
On my return this morning I found man had been admitted suffering from the effects of 
his internment at Halhul. He is a Hebron man who had the misfortune to be caught in the 
round up. He has not suffered permanently and is not seriously ill. The point is that he 
strikes me as being a quiet and reliable witness. He denies the lurid stories that were set 
forth in the two [Arab] petitions you showed me this morning, and says that apart from 
one man who was drowned in a well only the ten men we know of died from exposure. 
The death of this man in the well was bad enough, but again he says the horrible story 
told in the petition is not true. The man was suffering badly from thirst and in order to get 
a drink he told a false story of a rifle hidden in a well. He was let down into the well and 
drank his fill, but on being hauled up empty handed he was struck with the butts of rifles. 
He had a knife and managed to cut the cord on which he depended, fell back into the well 
and was drowned. My patient said the first few days were terrible, and the allowance of 
water was pitifully small. He says that he and others did in fact drink their own urine. 
During the latter part of his internment – he was there twelve days in all – things were 
somewhat better. As is usual with the oriental petitioner, these folk seem to spoil their 
case with exaggeration and falsehood. In this present case surely the unvarnished truth 
was terrible enough.
25
 
 
Other atrocities 
There are other references to similar excesses in the primary sources. Forster mentions a „worse‟ 
atrocity at the village of Bayt Rima, another example of the tangential comments to other 
incidents for which there is some corroborating evidence: „Apparently the military authorities 
declare that they have issued strict instructions against “frightfulness.” I don‟t know if this makes 
things better or worse. Ballard [a military officer in Hebron] says a man at Beit [Bayt] Rima died 
after a beating by an officer. “He‟s a known sadist” is the explanation.‟26 The Anglican Bishop in 
Jerusalem wrote of „serious charges‟ against soldiers in operations at Bayt Rima and Michmash, 
following which the Bishop protested to senior officers.
27
 The Anglican Mission in Jerusalem 
listed twenty-two villages and towns in which troops inflicted single or multiple outrages, 
sometimes over a period of many months.
28
 In 1977, a local man (and, likely, a rebel), Qasim al-
Rimawi, claimed that three villagers were tortured to death by troops at Bayt Rima during a 
thirteen-day search involving 2,000 troops.
29
 In November 1938, the army also set up fake 
executions for villagers in Halhul in the hope of getting them to hand over weapons, as a major 
recalled with „enormous pride‟ in a conversation with Forster.30 There is a reference in the 
regimental journal of the RUR to „severe reprisals‟ following the death of soldier in a landmine 
attack on the „Yirka track‟ (Yirka/Yarka, a Druze village about six miles south-east of Acre) in 
February 1939.
31
 „The Royal Ulster Rifles treated the Arabs very firmly indeed but by Jove it 
paid dividends but of course you can‟t do those sorts of things today,‟ was how one RUR officer 
put it.
32
 
After a soldier was blown up by a mine near the village of Kafr Yasif in February 1939, 
soldiers burnt down seventy houses, blew up forty more and, reportedly, then told nine villagers 
from the neighbouring village of Kuwaykat to run after which the soldiers gunned them down.
33
 
„I do not think the circumstances differ from those with which we are familiar,‟ noted a local 
Anglican Chaplain.
34
 Under pressure from the Anglican clergy, the army provided some relief to 
the homeless villagers, the Anglican Chaplain in Haifa concluding: 
 
On the whole I cannot help wondering at the way the Arabs trust us and believe us and 
believe that in the end we will try and do what is right. Some of the villages which have 
recently been hardly [sic] hit seem to go as far as possible in making allowances. 
Sometimes they appear to accept the severest treatment as the inevitable result of acts of 
violence by the gangs, even though they themselves are not responsible. And they do not 
hold the government responsible for actions taken by the military authorities, though we 
know that the government can‟t disclaim responsibility. The people at Kafr Yasif were 
very eager to point out that the troops who destroyed their houses were not English but 
Irish.
35
 
 Following the reprisal attack on Kafr Yasif, local Arabs gathered outside the German Consulate 
shouting „We want Hitler – We want Mussolini.‟36 
Arab sources make claims of police assassination squads abducting and killing 
villagers,
37
 the RAF‟s use of „incendiary bombs‟ on villages near Bad al-Wad west of Jerusalem 
resulting in „burnt‟ bodies, artillery firing on villages at night „sowing fear among the hearts of 
women and children,‟ women being attacked by soldiers, bias in favour of the Jews, and 
desecration of mosques and Korans.
38
 Arab leaders complained to Wauchope, the High 
Commissioner, that police and soldiers were „desecrating mosques, stealing personal property, 
destroying Korans and beating people up.‟39 In retaliation, Palestinians targeted officials, often 
those who were especially brutal or pro-Zionist, one early victim being the British police 
inspector, Alan Sigrist, „sentenced to death‟ by local Jerusalemites, and shot along with his guard 
by two assassins in his car on 12 June 1936 outside St Stephen‟s Gate by the Old City in 
Jerusalem.
40
 Notorious for his savage truncheon-wielding  attacks on Arabs, including beating up 
the staff of the al-Difa‘ newspaper office in May 1936, Sigrist launched indiscriminate assaults 
on Arab passers-by, including a well-dressed District Officer who refused to pick up nails left by 
rebels hoping to puncture tyres.
41
 After Sigrist‟s shooting, British soldiers captured and, 
allegedly, maltreated one of his wounded attackers, kicking and beating him with rifle butts in 
the back of a truck, after which he died.
42
 Another high-profile victim was Lewis Andrews, 
Assistant District Commissioner in Galilee, shot leaving church on 26 September 1937, accused 
of supporting Zionism; on 24 August 1938, a gunman shot dead British acting Assistant District 
Commissioner W. S. S. Moffat, „known for his bad behaviour.‟43 
 
Treatment of women 
Regarding troops‟ behaviour toward Palestinian women, there are some complaints of soldiers 
molesting women, usually the claim that they touched women‟s breasts:  „the wife of Asfur 
[„Asfur] Shihadeh of Bir Zeit [Bir Zayt] while on her way to the village spring for water was 
stopped by a soldier who proceeded to search her and feel her breasts….On the same day, July 
6th, 5 women of Bir Zeit [Bir Zayt] were fetching water from the spring to the north of the 
village. The troops rushed, searched them and shamelessly handled their breasts and bodies in 
spite of their cries and protests.‟44 Similarly, there is an account of an attempted assault by troops 
who „attempted to attack the honour of the wife of Issa [„Isa] Rabah but she refused and yelled 
for help and consequently was rescued from the claws of the civilised troops by her village 
women neighbours.‟45 Again, „In another case the soldiers went in and found an unmarried girl 
in bed they forcibly took off her vest played with her breasts and tried to assault her but her 
shrieks attracted the neighbours and this was prevented.‟46 At a search at Tulkarm, soldiers made 
women line up in front of them and bare their breasts to prove that they were not men.
47
 There 
was also an accusation of an assault against a girl, directed at British troops: „Sophiye Ibrahim 
Hamoud [Hamud] aged 12, raped by the army. She received a dangerous wound on her head 
which broke the skull.‟48 Finally, there was a serious sexual assault allegation but this was 
against three Arab policemen, not British soldiers: „They beat me with their rifle butts – laid me 
on the ground. One sat on my chest and kept my mouth shut, etc., while another assaulted me – 
then the men changed places; all three had me in turn.‟49  
The issue of sexual violence is opaque and bears further examination, but, in general, the 
Arabs complained about British physical force, not sexual assault against women. It seems that 
sexual violence was not a serious issue, and some of the allegations might have resulted from 
soldiers‟ clumsy attempts to search frightened women. Servicemen shot dead stone-throwing 
women, but they were careful to avoid sexual offence – as were the Israelis after 1948 who, 
again, used inherited British repressive methods against the Palestinians.
50
 When it came to 
searching local women, female „wardresses‟ attached to British units were deployed to search 
women villagers down to their „private parts.‟51 On another occasion, an army officer 
complained of police „mismanagement‟ in failing to bring along a female „searcher‟ on an 
operation, suggesting that female searchers were used in the field.
52
 There were, however, very 
few female police searchers, some Arab/Armenian, some Jewish, for the whole of Palestine, so 
outside the major towns women should not have been searched unless a woman searcher was 
present, impracticable in fast-moving operations. The British used Jewish and Armenian women 
as searchers – „no British woman would lower herself to do it‟ – but, for example, in October 
1938 in Jerusalem they had just two Arab women for this task, one at the Jaffa Gate and one at 
the Damascus Gate.
53
 In June 1936, when the British wanted to search women escaping the 
destruction of old Jaffa, they sent seven women from the prison service in Jerusalem down to 
Jaffa for the job, commandeering a local building especially for the purpose.
54
 The British police 
claimed that the Arab rebels hid their „stuff‟ with Palestinian women, the Arabs countering that 
hidden goods were simply valuables or money that they did not want stolen by servicemen.
55
 
 
Regimental differences 
Nor did the British army act as one, regiments behaving differently on operations. Arab 
propaganda played on the fact that Scottish regiments were especially unpleasant. One Arab 
leaflet, written into (clumsy) English for distribution to soldiers, made clear the link between 
abuses and Scottish troops deployed to Palestine: 
 One can never imagine inhuman deeds than bombing up the houses over their inhabitants 
of innocent ladies and children, of robbing passengers, then shooting them, of ruining 
whole villages and scattering their inhabitants to die of cold and thirst; and of obliterating 
the ladies of those killed persons in order that they might terrify the peaceful citizens. 
These savage actions are mostly committed by „ROYAL SCOTCH REGIMENTS,‟ in so 
many places of Palestine; and hundreds of photographs are kept for future generations to 
behold these actions of „ROYAL SCOTCH REGIMENTS.‟56 
 
This is corroborated by police office Burr who noted that Scottish regiments were the „worst 
offenders‟ when it came to causing trouble, and „if an Arab sees anybody in a kilt they run a 
mile. In the trouble last year they used the bayonet on the slightest excuse.‟57 The Arabs were 
aware of regimental differences, with Arab students in London in May 1939 protesting 
specifically against Black Watch soldiers following the Halhul outrage.
58
 Following the death of 
two Black Watch soldiers by the Jaffa Gate in Jerusalem on 5 November 1937, General 
Archibald Wavell remarked on the restraint shown by the Black Watch on a subsequent 
operation against Silwan, the village south of the city blamed for the attack, although he admitted 
that a suspect died „falling over a cliff.‟59 Officially, after tracker dogs led the authorities to the 
village, one villager ended up hospital after falling off a cliff, while soldiers shot dead one man 
and wounded another. Then the authorities sealed the village forbidding villagers to leave 
without a permit, made all males report every evening to the police and made the village pay for 
a twenty-man police post.
60
 Yet, the private diary of a North Staffordshire Regiment officer tells 
a different tale, recording how Black Watch men beat to death twelve Arabs in Silwan with rifle 
butts after the death of their comrades.
61
 Palestine policemen recalled that Scottish regiments 
were especially tough when it came to dealing with the Arabs, and several later counter-
insurgency excesses after 1945 – at Batang Kali village in Malaya in 1948 (Scots Guards), the 
Aden „Crater‟ in 1967 (Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders) and the Falls Road in 1970 (Black 
Watch) – involved Scottish regiments.62  
Of course, the most serious single incident in Northern Ireland during the „Troubles‟ was 
the „Bloody Sunday‟ shooting in 1972 of twenty-seven civilians by the non-territorially based 
Parachute Regiment, suggesting that territorial/regional approaches to soldiers‟ behaviour and 
unit performance are not that useful. Thus, in Palestine, while Black Watch (Scottish) troops 
were involved in actions at Halhul and Silwan, other Scottish regiments behaved properly, as 
Forster noted concerning the change in the Hebron garrison from the Queen‟s Own Cameron 
Highlanders to the Cameronians (Scottish Rifles), „a far less aristocratic affair [and disbanded in 
the 1960s] but worth about six times their predecessors. Soon after their arrival a village patrol 
was ambushed and a truck blown up by a land mine….The Cameronians bore no malice and for 
the rest of their stay became very popular with the people. Gilmour [Captain G. H. Gilmour, the 
officer at the ambush] encouraged his men to go, in properly conducted parties, to look at the suq 
and the mosque.‟63 Moreover, English county regiments could also act very robustly.64 While 
certain regiments recruited heavily from certain regions, these differences were fundamentally 
regimental and not regional, and were a function of the internal dynamics and leadership within 
different regiments. All of the servicemen in Palestine were regular volunteers, so there was 
continuity at the grass-roots level, especially as the different regiments drew recruits from 
broadly similar socio-economic backgrounds who then experienced a shared training and 
soldiering regimen. But regiments were not the same, some had weaker or tougher leadership 
cadres and command structures, and different traditions of soldiering, and so brutality was more 
or less likely to occur when men went on operations against guerrillas.
65
 
 
Extra-judicial executions 
On occasion, servicemen took the law into their own hands, not least as they did not appreciate 
that the judicial system supported their work in the field against the rebels as, while military 
courts with no jury did sentence to death Arabs brought before them, they also acquitted suspects 
or handed out lesser sentences. For instance, of eighty-two persons tried in the period from 20 
May to 31 July 1938, the courts acquitted thirty-six, found one not guilty due to insanity and the 
average length of sentence was three and a half years. The British handed out nineteen death 
sentences, of which they commuted seven.
66
 One British military prosecutor recalled how a 
judge acquitted a sniper caught with a rifle and ammunition on a legal technicality, and that 
Jewish evidence would never be sufficient to convict an Arab: „The Arab Bar appreciate the 
impartiality of the military prosecutors.‟67 On the other hand, a policeman relating the trial of a 
Jewish rebel in the 1940s, described military justice as akin to „kangaroo courts.‟68  
The perceived leniency of the courts might help to explain the numbers of Arab suspects 
shot while „trying to escape,‟ a recurring phrase in police files and which policeman Burr admits 
were assassinations by colleagues who were tired of the legal system and so „shot out of hand‟ 
suspects.
69
 Briance confessed to his mother of colleagues shooting on the spot an arrested rebel.
70
 
Troops also shot captives, including the Palestinian suspected of assassinating acting Assistant 
District Commissioner Moffat in August 1938 in his office in Jenin. The British quickly 
apprehending the assassin after the murder – he was, apparently, a blond hunchback and so 
rather visible – after which he was shot trying to escape, despite his disability and being 
surrounded by fit, young British soldiers.
71
 Then again, the Arabs nicknamed Moffat‟s assassin, 
„Muhammad,‟ „gazelle‟ because he was so swift.72  
 
Conclusion 
By late 1938, once the Munich crisis had passed, the British had deployed two full-strength 
divisions to Palestine. The British government was keen to resolve the Palestine revolt before 
war broke out with Germany and so allowed these forces to increase the tempo of their 
operations. „The military command in Palestine and the High Commissioner were able to do 
more or less as they liked‟ because of the threat from Germany, recalled one officer in Palestine 
at the time.
73
 With such a large deployment, some level of human rights abuse was inevitable, 
especially as successful counter-insurgency demanded some degree of brutality. This article has 
uncovered evidence of blatant torture – and recognised as such at the time – but most of what it 
describes is premeditated, systematic, officially sanctioned brutality in the form of collective 
punishments and reprisals directed primarily at property not people. There are fewer instances of 
unpremeditated and extreme „wild‟ reactive rank-and-file brutality. These could reflect soldiers‟ 
anger at a guerrilla attack – notably if rebels killed or wounded a comrade in an attack – and a 
subsequent desire for revenge. Unofficial torture and brutality were illegal then and now – pace 
the arguments of those such as Alan Dershowitz legitimising the use of torture against terrorist 
suspects.
74
 The officially directed brutality was legal at the time, leaving aside the moral outrage 
that such action would now provoke. Britain‟s concern to follow the law – modified as necessary 
– meant that her actions were usually within the law. 
While some incidents such as al-Bassa meet the dictionary definition of an atrocity, these 
outrages were not the systematic excesses that one would expect to see in a police state in which 
service personnel could act without „moral reference.‟ In her charged attack on British 
imperialism, Elkins described Kenya in the 1950s as „Britain‟s Gulag,‟ not a phrase that is 
readily applicable to Palestine in the 1930s, at least not with the records currently available.
75
 
Army actions at Halhul and al-Bassa saw the deaths of around thirty-five people, tragic, wrong 
and illegal, but in a three-year insurgency evidence that restraint and „moral reference‟ rather 
than unalloyed wickedness guided military operations. Having said this, other outrages similar to 
those at al-Bassa and Halhul undoubtedly occurred – this article has touched on some of them – 
although the numbers of dead in each incident were small. Cumulatively, however, these boost 
the figure of thirty-five dead to something much greater, especially if one considers the recurring 
incidence of single or several Arabs shot dead while running from troops, although troops were 
legally empowered to shoot „suspects‟ who were running away following a verbal challenge. 
The question is partly how one measures the severity of excesses, partly what one looks 
for in the archival material. Wilson, the British teacher in the village of Bir Zayt, noted that the 
British soldiers whom she met on a daily basis behaved very correctly towards both herself and 
the local Palestinian community.
76
 Of course, that Bir Zayt was a Christian Arab village in which 
there were female British teachers could also explain the troops‟ gentler behaviour, but when 
soldiers detained some local Arabs and took them into captivity in Ramallah prison, they did 
little to them beyond making them mend some buildings. The Arabs‟ main complain to Wilson 
was that the better-educated ones resented their gaolers leaving them in a cell with ordinary 
peasants. The extent of British military violence towards the suspects was to manhandle them 
through the door into the basement cell in which the soldiers detained them. Once released, their 
soldier gaolers gave the local men cigarettes and then a lift home.
77
 The villagers were „not 
specially indignant, taking it rather as part of life‟s general unpleasantness. “Turkish soldiers 
before 1918,” they said, “English soldiers now. All soldiers are alike.”‟78 Forster, typically very 
critical of the British army, also commented on positive changes in British behaviour in Hebron 
– „military thieving has stopped‟ – showing that there was no consistent pattern of abuse.79 
Local Arab women came to see Miss Hulbert, one of Wilson‟s Bir Zayt teaching 
colleagues, crying and complaining about the British detaining their menfolk for road repairs: 
„“They are beating them! The soldiers are beating our men!” “Beating!” exclaimed Miss Hulbert. 
“How do you mean – like this?” giving an energetic pantomime of two-handed whacking with a 
stick. “Oh no no!” replied the women. “Only like this” – demonstrating the mildest of pats and 
pushes; obviously no more than would be necessary to show the men where to go or what to do – 
not surprising when soldiers and villagers cannot speak each other‟s language.‟80 Whom are we 
to believe? Both Forster and Wilson are credible witnesses, both spoke some Arabic and both 
were sympathetic to the Palestinians amongst whom they lived. Similarly, the account above 
from „Abd al-Hamid Shuman‟s son regarding his father‟s maltreatment at al-Mazra„a detention 
camp is not supported by one of Shuman‟s fellow detainees, „Abd al-Hamid Sa‟ih, who 
remembered calling in take-away food, jogging, sun-beds, educational classes, and a prison 
governor‟s „humane gesture…worthy of praise and I thank him for this.‟81 
British troops acted correctly and with humanity. „If we wounded a terrorist or anything 
like that well I mean he was usually looked after as well as one of our own chaps. I don‟t think 
there was any great sort of animosity,‟ or, „British soldiery were very bad at brutality; we used it 
half-heartedly or even not at all.‟82 The Arab revolt raises methodological issues when faced with 
masses of primary evidence pointing in opposite directions. Soldiers‟ memories of the conflict 
vary greatly, acts of great kindness sitting oddly alongside brutality towards vulnerable people, 
sometimes in the same soldier‟s record, all evidence of the peculiar experience of soldiering and 
the later process of memory and historical record. Similarly, Arabic accounts are not consistent 
and do seem, at times, exaggerated. Perhaps the issue is whether one is looking to support or 
deprecate the British army, its counter-insurgency methods and imperial rule generally. 
By the end of the revolt, Palestinian villagers were referring to the guerrillas not as 
mujahidin in a holy war but as rebels (thuwwar).
83
 While grossly unfair, the targeting of non-
combatants worked, the British suppressing the revolt by 1939, leaving them free to deploy their 
troops for the coming war in Europe. Britain directed operations against the Palestinian Muslim 
population along with the rebel bands that the army hunted down, when it could find them and 
bring them to battle. As with later successful counter-insurgency campaigns such as Malaya in 
the 1950s, British forces discriminated in Palestine, targeting the Muslim community while 
working with or treating leniently friendly groups in Palestine such as the Yishuv – the pre-1948 
Jewish community in Palestine – and, arguably, the Druzes and the Christian Palestinians, the 
latter a sensitive subject that deserves more examination. Support for the Yishuv during the revolt 
is beyond the remit of this article, but Britain‟s recruitment of thousands of extra Jewish 
supernumerary police – 14,411 according to one source – was one sign of her recognition of the 
relative value of the different communities in Palestine.
84
 When inflicting reprisals and 
instituting collective fines, the British treated the Jews softly, avoiding, for instance, house 
demolition of Jewish homes in Tiberias following the death of an Arab in a land mine attack.
85
 
After 1936 in Palestine, the British established a systematic, systemic, officially 
sanctioned policy of destruction, punishment, reprisal and brutality that fractured and 
impoverished the Palestinian population. Most of this repression was legal to the letter of the 
military law and the emergency regulations in force in Palestine after 1936. The army maintained 
that destruction was not its primary aim during operations even when this was its operational 
method, suggesting that soldiers knew that such actions were questionable morally if not legally 
– servicemen also had orders banning photographing of demolitions.86 The authorities 
(re)constructed the law to give soldiers‟ actions legality. The British had to balance what was 
lawful, what was morally right, and what worked, and these were not compatible. The 
regulations in force after 1936 made, as a pro-Arab British resident of Haifa wrote, „lawful 
things which otherwise would be unlawful.‟87 Lawlessness was the law. Servicemen were guided 
by a legal system that meant that they could accept the premises of their government that allowed 
for brutal actions, and they could do so with all the energy of good bureaucrats obeying orders.  
Looking at the Arab revolt as a whole, extreme acts of personal abuse were probably not 
systematic, and almost certainly not systemic. Admittedly, the British high command tolerated 
the less blatant abuses committed by its men in the field, but senior officers based in Haifa and 
Jerusalem were sensitive to charges of abuse, politically if not morally, and so it was junior 
officers in the field who were intimately involved in any excesses. The Anglican Bishop in 
Jerusalem put it succinctly, writing how outrages „are not officially sanctioned although they 
have not been officially regretted.‟88 Whether there was an unwritten code from on high 
sanctioning grass-roots level gross abuse is unproved, and probably impossible to prove, 
precisely because those involved were unwilling to leave a written record of such orders. For the 
Anglican Bishop, those in the „highest positions of authority‟ deplored the deaths of innocent 
civilians, suggesting that civil and military forces acted as a brake on counter-rebel operations.
89
 
Britain‟s forces of repression were not united, with the army, for instance, working with the Shai, 
the Zionist intelligence branch, handing it Arab material to translate, sidelining the colonial 
administration that opposed army „methods‟ that were outside „usual police activities.‟90 
Britain lost control of Palestine in the late 1930s during the Arab revolt. Faced with 
similar disturbances, other imperial powers responded much more harshly than the British did in 
Palestine, as even a cursory glance at other twentieth-century counter-insurgency campaigns 
shows, whether it is the Spanish in the Rif mountains, the Germans in Africa before the Great 
War and during the Second World War, the Japanese in China, the Italians in Libya, the French 
in Algeria, the Americans in Vietnam, the Portuguese in Africa or the Soviets in Afghanistan. 
These actions included systemic, boundless violence, large-scale massacres of civilians and 
POWs, forced starvation, overt racism, gross torture, sexual violence and rape, the removal of 
legal process, the use of chemical and biological weapons against civilians, ethnic cleansing, 
extermination camps and genocide. This does not excuse British abuses in Palestine but it 
provides some comparative context. Put simply, in Palestine the British were often brutal but 
they were rarely atrocious. Perhaps this is the best that can be said for the British „way‟ in 
repressing the Arab insurgency in Palestine: it was, relatively speaking, humane and restrained – 
the awfulness was less awful – when compared to the methods used by other colonial and neo-
colonial powers operating in similar circumstances, an achievement, of sorts. 
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